Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Your Standing Committee on Government Operations is pleased to provide its Report on the Review of Bill 12: Northern Employee Benefits Services Pension Plan Act, and commends it to the House.
The Standing Committee on Government Operations – “the Standing Committee” – is pleased to report on its review of Bill 12, Northern Employee Benefits Services Pension Plan Act.
Bill 12, sponsored by the Department of Finance, sets out the legislative framework for the continuation of the Northern Employee Benefits Services, NEBS, Pension Plan as a multi-employer, multi-jurisdictional pension plan for employees of approved public sector employers in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.
Bill 12 received second reading in the Legislative Assembly on February 27, 2014, and was referred to the Standing Committee on Government Operations for review.
NEBS has been in existence since 1979 and was incorporated as a not-for-profit corporation in 1999. At that time the plan was regulated under the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act, PBSA. In 2004 the federal office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, OSFI, determined that the NEBS Pension Plan no longer qualified for regulation under federal legislation. This decision meant that member pension contributions were no longer protected from creditors and locking-in provisions and plan portability outside the Northwest Territories and Nunavut were lost. Additionally, while the NEBS Board of Directors continued to govern the NEBS Pension Plan in voluntary compliance with the PBSA, they no longer had the legislative authority to govern and manage the plan with certainty.
In 2009 the GNWT enacted the Northern Employee Benefits Services Pension Plan Act, as did Nunavut, which provides protection from creditors for member contributions. However, this still left NEBS conducting business in the absence of a legislative foundation. Bill 12 represents the collective efforts of the Government of the Northwest Territories’ Department of Finance and the Government of Nunavut’s Department of Community and Government Services, working in collaboration with NEBS, to resolve that problem.
The multi-jurisdictional nature of the proposed legislation governing NEBS has presented unique challenges related to the development and review of Bill 12. It has created a situation in which two distinct, sovereign Legislatures are simultaneously considering amendments to two separate, but virtually identical, pieces of legislation governing a single body that conducts business in both jurisdictions. Therefore, at the same time that the Standing Committee on Government Operations has been considering Bill 12, our counterpart in Nunavut, the Standing Committee on Legislation of the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut, has been considering Bill 1.
While the circumstances that have given rise to two different Legislatures in two independently-governed jurisdictions considering “mirrored” legislation are unusual, they are not without precedent. The last time this situation occurred was in 2007, when both Nunavut and the Northwest Territories considered a new Workers’ Compensation Act. Passage of this act allowed both jurisdictions to continue to share a single Workers’ Safety and Compensation Commission and to enjoy the economies of scale that come with doing so. It is in this same vein that the NEBS Pension Plan Act has been developed and is being considered, to allow employers and workers in both jurisdictions to participate in a single pension plan.
Given the complexity of the bill, and the high degree of collaboration required between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories to facilitate concurrent reviews of Bill 1 and Bill 12, respectively, both committees determined that additional time would be required to complete their reviews. Consequently, consistent with each Legislature’s own rules, each standing committee sought to extend the review period for its respective bill by an additional 120 days. On October 27, 2014, the Government of Nunavut passed Motion 012-4(2): Extension of Review Period for Bill 1, Northern Employee Benefits Services Pension Plan Act. On October 29, 2014, the chair of the Standing Committee on Government Operations, in accordance with Rule 70(1) of the Rules of the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, requested in the House, under reports of committees on the review of bills, an extension by 120 days to the period of time allowed for the standing committee’s review of Bill 12.
The committee wishes to take this opportunity to thank their counterparts and officials in Nunavut for their timely cooperation and spirit of collaboration which contributed to the successful review of this important bill.
Mr. Speaker, through you, I’ll ask Ms. Bisaro to continue with the report. Mahsi.
Thank you, Mr. Nadli. Ms. Bisaro.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
The Standing Committee on Government Operations held a public hearing on Bill 12, in Yellowknife, on September 25, 2014. The committee anticipated that there would be some degree of stakeholder interest in Bill 12, owing to the importance placed by most individuals on matters related to their pensions. However, the turnout for the meeting exceeded the committee’s expectations. The committee wishes to thank everyone who attended the public hearing, especially for their forbearance regarding the somewhat crowded committee room.
The chair of the standing committee opened the meeting, followed by opening remarks by the Honourable J. Michael Miltenberger, Minister of Finance, and Mr. John McKee, president/chairman of NEBS. Opening remarks were followed by presentations made by Mr. Mike Aumond, deputy minister, Department of Finance; and Mr. Shawn Maley, chief executive officer, NEBS.
The following individuals were also present as part of the delegations:
Mr. Jamie Koe, director of corporate services, Department of Finance, GNWT;
Ms. Kelly McLaughlin, director, legal services, Department of Justice, GNWT;
Mr. Carl Bird, director, NEBS;
Mr. Jeff Renaud, director, NEBS; and
Ms. Nicole Pintkowsky, director, program operations, NEBS.
The committee received oral and written submissions from:
Mr. Dennis Adams, a retired NEBS pensioner and former CEO of NEBS, writing as a member of the public;
Mr. James Anderson, a member of the public;
Mr. Jack Bourassa, regional executive vice-president, north, Public Service Alliance of Canada;
Ms. Mary Lou Cherwaty, president, Northern Territories Federation of Labour;
Mr. Metro Huculak, superintendent, Yellowknife Education District No. 1;
Mr. Kevin Hynes, president, International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 2890;
Mr. James Infantino, pensions and disability insurance officer, national programs section, membership programs branch, Public Service Alliance of Canada; and
Ms. Gayla Meredith, president, and Mr. Dave Roebuck, executive director, Northwest Territories Teachers’ Association.
Outside of the call for submissions, the committee also received correspondence related to Bill 12 from:
Ms. Sara Brown, chief executive officer, NWT Association of Communities; and
Mr. Shawn Maley, chief executive officer, NEBS.
All submissions received by the committee are appended to this report.
It is clear from the passion with which presenters spoke that pension security is an emotionally-charged subject matter and one that is very important to those who work hard to save towards their retirement. The standing committee found all of the submissions it received to be thoughtful and carefully considered and wishes to thank everyone who took the time to provide a submission on Bill 12. While the comments on Bill 12 were broad-ranging, the following themes emerged from the submissions:
All of the submissions we received acknowledged the need for and were supportive, in principle, of legislation to govern NEBS. There was no one who expressed the opinion that NEBS should continue to be administered in the absence of a legislative framework.
Despite the support for legislation in some form, the degree of support for Bill 12 varied and all of the submissions raised concerns regarding aspects of the bill that were considered to be problematic.
Of the eight submissions received, one was supportive of Bill 12, but acknowledged those parts of the bill that were likely to be contentious and offered suggestions as to how those areas of concern might be addressed. One was supportive, provided that NEBS remained a “defined-benefits” pension plan. Three submissions called for Bill 12 to be withdrawn, or abandoned in its current form, on the basis that inadequate consultation had taken place with pension holders and called for a meaningful consultation process to be established in place of Bill 12.
Ultimately, after considering all of the input received, the standing committee felt that the withdrawal of Bill 12 would be counterproductive. The committee felt that the key concerns of stakeholders could be addressed with appropriate changes to Bill 12. It is on this basis that committee proposed 12 motions to amend the gill which are discussed in greater detail under the section of the report titled “What We Did.”
Going into the public hearing on Bill 12, the committee was concerned that pension beneficiaries had not been adequately consulted during the preparation of Bill 12. This concern was substantiated by several of the presenters, some who confirmed that no consultation was undertaken with the bargaining agents representing pension beneficiaries and some who noted that, as pension-holders, they had received no information or meaningful consultation on the proposed legislation.
When asked specifically about the government’s consultation efforts, Minister Miltenberger spoke about the consultation that took place with the Nunavut government and Mr. Aumond added that the GNWT consulted with the NEBS Board. Mr. Maley described the consultation effort by NEBS as “extensive,” adding that NEBS made a point of telling beneficiaries what is going on with the development of Bill 12.
The committee was persuaded that Bill 12 was developed in the absence of meaningful consultation with pension beneficiaries. Meaningful consultation depends on those being consulted having adequate information, time to consider it and the ability to have input into decisions before they are made. The committee has no reason to doubt the truth of Mr. Maley’s claim that beneficiaries were provided with information about the legislation as it was being developed. However, merely providing information does not constitute consultation.
In this regard, the committee feels that, ultimately, it is the Minister of Finance as the sponsor of the bill who has a duty to ensure that adequate and appropriate consultation takes place with all stakeholders, including pension beneficiaries. By restricting their consultation efforts to the Government of Nunavut and NEBS Board members and officials, this duty was not met by the Department of Finance.
Clauses 15(1)(a) and (b) of Bill 12 authorize the Pension Committee “at any time, from time to time,” to retroactively reduce accrued ancillary benefits and to reduce core pension benefits on a going-forward basis. Serious concerns were raised regarding this provision because it was seen to be giving the Pension Committee this power under circumstances in which a majority of the Pension Committee members represent employer members of NEBS, not employee pension holders. These concerns were exacerbated by the fact that the definition of what benefits are considered “core” versus “ancillary” is not included in the legislation, but is instead left to be defined in the plan documents.
NEBS representatives responded to this concern by noting that ancillary benefits would be defined narrowly as cost of living indexing benefits and that the Pension Committee has no intention of reducing ancillary benefits accrued before the coming-into-force date of Bill 12.
The committee believes that the representatives of NEBS who appeared before the committee were well-meaning and sincere in their efforts to develop legislation governing the NEBS Pension Plan. The committee has no reason to disbelieve the information they were provided, which included assurances from NEBS representatives that they have no intention of reducing any benefits. These assurances notwithstanding, the committee is aware that the legislation has the potential to long outlast the current NEBS Board and administration and that, as drafted, Bill 12 provides the authority for the retroactive reduction of accrued ancillary benefits and the future reduction of core benefits not yet accrued.
As a result of the concerns heard, the standing committee moved Motion 6 which, among other things, removes the ability of the NEBS Board or Pension Committee to retroactively reduce any accrued benefits. Motion 6 is discussed in further detail below, as are Motions 8 and 11, which are related to Motion 6.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to pass the reading of the report to my colleague Mr. Dolynny.
Thank you, Ms. Bisaro. Mr. Dolynny.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Thank you, Ms. Bisaro.
Closely related to the proposal allowing the retroactive reduction of ancillary benefits is the issue of how Bill 12 would affect the nature of the NEBS plan. Presenters who spoke against Bill 12 expressed the view that the NEBS plan is a defined-benefit pension model and that the provision allowing the retroactive reduction of ancillary benefits, if and when put into effect, would effectively shift NEBS to a target-benefit pension model.
A defined-benefit pension plan is a type of plan which pays a guaranteed, predetermined benefit on retirement. The plan is 'defined' in the sense that the benefit formula is specified and known in advance. On the other hand, a target-benefit pension plan is one in which future benefits are based on affordability projections and may vary as a function of the funding status of the plan. Plan members, therefore, share a greater degree of plan risk through adjustments to their benefits.
Committee found the discussion around this point to be complicated by the fact that participants did not have a shared understanding of what constitutes a “defined-benefit” plan. Both the Department of Finance and NEBS representatives put forth the proposition that by continuing to protect “core” benefits from reduction, the nature of the NEBS Pension Plan under Bill 12 remained a “defined-benefits” plan.
The bill’s detractors expressed the view that giving the Pension Committee the authority to retroactively reduce any accrued benefits – core or otherwise – would have the effect of changing the NEBS plan from a defined-benefit to a target-benefit model. Participants referred to this as “sacrilege” and “breaking the pension promise,” arguing that NEBS employers had entered into a covenant with employees to provide a set pension benefit based on their contributions, and that to reduce this retroactively is tantamount to reneging on this covenant.
In order to understand the significance of the shift from a defined- to a target-benefit model, committee found it important to look at trends in pension reform in the larger Canadian context. Committee’s research showed that, across Canada and in other industrialized nations, there has been a movement in recent years away from defined-benefit pension models to models in which the benefits are targeted. This shift has been precipitated by the challenges faced by both public and private sector employers in keeping their pension funds solvent. The movement to a target-benefit model is one approach being employed to address the problem of pension solvency. However, it is not without its critics. Views and perceptions around target-benefit pension models have the potential to be polarizing, depending upon one’s position.
The committee did not feel that it was necessary to reach agreement regarding what constitutes a “defined-benefit” pension. Regardless of the label used, it was clear to the committee that the retroactive reduction of any accrued benefits, whether considered to be “ancillary” or “core,” was something that pension beneficiaries did not want to see happen. At the same time, the standing committee is cognizant of the need for the NEBS Board and Pension Committee to have tools that allow them to maintain a solvent plan otherwise all beneficiaries are ultimately at risk of receiving little or no pension whatsoever.
To address these concerns, the committee moved Motion 6, which has the effect of ensuring that the NEBS pension remains a defined-benefit plan. For further certainty, the term “defined-benefit” is incorporated into the bill through Motion 1.
Section 11 of Bill 12, as originally drafted, authorizes the composition of the NEBS Board to be set out in the NEBS bylaws. It also gives the board the exclusive authority to appoint members or set the rules for their election to the Pension Committee, in addition to determining their numbers and length of term. Section 12 specifies that there must be at least two members on the Pension Committee who are independent to the extent that neither is a member of the board or an employee of a participating employer. Sections 11 and 12 also establish the authorities of the NEBS Board and Pension Committee respectively.
A good deal of the input heard by the committee pertained to this governance model established for the NEBS Pension Plan by Bill 12. The committee was told that the legislation “fails to establish good governance;” that “the governance model is seriously flawed;” that it “imposes a flawed administrative process with no effective voice for the parties that bear the risk;” and that it “leaves all major decisions in the hands of the NEBS Board and Pension Committee, which are dominated by employers.”
In illustrating this point, presenters made specific note of Section 15(3), which effectively gives employers, represented by the NEBS Board, the power to opt out of contribution increases, thereby placing the burden for an under-funded plan fully on employees.
These submissions called for the implementation of a joint-governance pension-plan model. The standing committee considered the implications of this and determined that such an approach would likely necessitate a rewrite of the bill, which would delay the implementation of pension legislation for NEBS possibly beyond the life of the 17th Assembly. The standing committee opted to focus its efforts on making amendments to the existing bill, with the hope and expectation that it could be amended to address the major concerns raised, without unduly delaying the bill’s passage.
One submission expressed the opinion that it is unnecessary to change the governance structure of the plan to ensure that the needs of pension beneficiaries are considered, because the fiduciary duty of the Pension Committee members requires them to act on behalf of beneficiaries. The Minister’s staff and NEBS representatives also made this assertion that NEBS pension committee members will act in the interests of pension beneficiaries because they have a fiduciary obligation to do so.
The standing committee gave a great deal of consideration to this view. While standing committee members acknowledge the importance of the fiduciary obligations of Pension Committee members, the existence of this obligation alone cannot overcome the biases inherent in a governance design that favours employer over employee interests. If that were the case, observed the standing committee, then fiduciary duty would have resulted in a more meaningful consultation with employee pension beneficiaries during the development of Bill 12.
In response to concerns heard, the standing committee moved Motion 5 to mandate in the legislation the composition of the Pension Committee. Motions 3 and 4 are also related to the powers of the Pension Committee and are discussed in further detail below.
A number of presenters raised concerns about sections of the bill that they viewed as giving the GNWT too much power and influence over the NEBS plan and/or the NEBS Board and Pension Committee.
Some presenters expressed a concern that Section 9(1) of the bill, for example, “invests enormous and far-reaching powers to the Minister, with no recourse except to the courts,” thereby giving the GNWT too much power to override decisions.
The committee considered these concerns but recognized that the removal of this provision from the bill would leave the Minister unable to act in the event that there was a failure to manage the NEBS plan in compliance with the act.
The committee looked to other pieces of legislation providing similar powers to the Minister to step in and act in the event of a problem. One example is offered by Section 156 of the Cities, Towns and Villages Act, which allows the Minister to intervene in the affairs of a municipal corporation. In this case, the Minister may only act in unusual circumstances to address problems that have arisen. Similar powers are contained in Section 17 of the Hospital Insurance and Health and Social Services Administration Act which allows the Minister to appoint a person to act as a public administrator of a health or social services facility under specific circumstances where care is jeopardized.
Having reviewed similar provisions in other legislation, the committee is of the view that the powers provided to the Minister in Section 9(1) of Bill 12 reasonably afford the government the authority to enforce its legislation, and only in the event that specified problems arise.
Similar concerns were raised regarding Section 10(2) of Bill 12. This clause specifies that in the event that the GNWT becomes a member of NEBS, then the GNWT must adhere to the requirements of a participating member. Some presenters felt that this clause allows the GNWT to become a plan member, with too much power under Section 15(2) and (3).
The committee considered this concern but determined that it was based on a lack of understanding about the purpose of the clause. The intent of the clause is to give greater certainty that if the GNWT were to join NEBS, it would enjoy no special privileges as an employer member. This clause was described by a member of the Department of Finance delegation as a comfort clause included at the request of the NEBS Board.
The existence of clause 10(2) does not “permit” the GNWT to join NEBS. In fact it is Section 22, which defines a “public sector employer” as including “a territorial government,” that permits the GNWT to join NEBS. Therefore, the removal of clause 10(2) does not prevent the GNWT from joining NEBS. Its removal does, however, eliminate the certainty provided by the clause that the GNWT must follow the rules in the same manner as any other member employer. For this reason, the committee determined that the clause should remain in the bill.
Through you, Mr. Speaker, I would like to pass this to my colleague Mr. Moses. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Dolynny. Mr. Moses.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Thank you, Mr. Dolynny.
Section 31 of Bill 12 sets out the requirement that the NEBS plan be funded on a going concern basis, rather than a solvency basis.
Although this was not raised as a concern in any of the submissions received by the standing committee, the committee gave consideration to this section of the bill, which represents a change in the way NEBS has conducted its business in the past.
A solvency valuation is performed to determine the funded status of a plan if it were to terminate on a certain date. It is a common practice for private sector plans to be funded on a solvency basis where there is a much greater risk that a plan might wind up as a result of bankruptcy or business closure.
A going-concern valuation, by comparison, is calculated based on whether or not there is enough money now in the plan, when combined with expected new contributions, to cover the benefits of current and future retirees.
The standing committee was persuaded by NEBS’ position that it is more appropriate that this pension be funded on a going-concern basis, as it is a type of pension plan that is likely to operate indefinitely and one which is not facing an immediate threat to its existence.
In order to deal with the practicalities of operating the NEBS plan in a multi-jurisdictional environment, Bill 12 allows for the Minister responsible to enter into intergovernmental agreements respecting matters related to the NEBS plan. In some defined circumstances, the terms of an intergovernmental agreement will prevail, if there is a conflict, over some sections of the act.
The standing committee acknowledged the rationale for intergovernmental agreements, given the multi-jurisdictional nature of the NEBS plan, but was concerned about ensuring in the legislation that the power afforded to governments, in entering into intergovernmental agreements, not be used in such a way as to circumvent requirements of the act. Motion 3 addresses this concern.
Clause 32 of Bill 12 specifies that, under the NEBS plan, the contribution rate for active members must be equal to the contribution rate for participating employers.
The standing committee considered the possibility that employers may wish to make pension contributions in excess of 50 percent, as an employment incentive to recruit and retain workers. The committee discussed with Minister Miltenberger the option of amending the legislation to provide the flexibility to the Pension Committee to increase the employer contribution rate beyond 50 percent.
In declining to concur with the committee’s proposal, the Minister offered the rationale that the trend for public sector plans across Canada is to require 50-50 cost sharing. The Minister also pointed out the inherent logic in enshrining a 50-50 cost sharing arrangement to complement the proposed amendments to clause 12 creating a 50-50 governance model for the Pension Committee.
The standing committee reviewed pension legislation across Canada, to determine how other jurisdictions addressed the matter of employee-employer contribution rates. Their research revealed that:
All of the statutes reviewed have clauses intended to prohibit an employee’s contributions to his or her pension from exceeding a certain level or threshold. Under the Pension Benefits Standards Act (Canada) and eight provincial statutes, the employee’s contribution plus interest may not exceed 50 percent.
The New Brunswick Pension Benefits Act permits the minimum employee contribution to be determined according to the relevant pension plan. However, where the pension plan is silent, then “the plan shall be deemed to have fixed the percentage at 50 percent.”
Three jurisdictions – Manitoba, Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador – refer to this as the “50-50 Rule.” In others, it is variously referred to as the “minimum commuted value,” “maximum employee cost,” or the “minimum employer contribution.”
The standing committee found that, while the effect of such provisions may be to create an environment where 50-50 cost sharing is likely to occur, the legislation is not worded to require cost-sharing. The committee’s research did not reveal any provisions in any of the statutes it reviewed that prohibit an employer from making a contribution in excess of 50 percent.
Therefore, while the committee was not persuaded by the Minister’s assertion that the trend across Canada is 50-50 cost-sharing, the committee was willing to concede that the amendments to clause 12, allowing for balanced employee-employer membership on the Pension Committee, was reasonable grounds for acceptance of the “50-50 rule.”
The standing committee listened intently and gave careful consideration to the opinions that were expressed at the public hearing on Bill 12.
The clause-by-clause review of the bill was held on February 19, 2014. At this meeting, the committee moved 12 separate motions to amend Bill 12. Each of these motions was carried and Minister Miltenberger concurred with each:
Motion 1:
This amendment clarifies, in legislation, the commitment to have the NEBS plan operate and be interpreted as a “defined benefit” plan rather than a “target benefit” plan. There is further discussion related to this motion under Motion 6, below.
Motion 2:
This amendment provides that no provision of an intergovernmental agreement may be used to waive statutory requirements of the act.
Motion 3:
This is a consequential motion necessitated by the amendment to clause 12, Motion 5, which specifies the number of pension committee members. Given that the composition of the pension committee will be set in the legislation, it is no longer appropriate, and legislatively confusing, to have the current sub-clause permitting the board to set the number remain in the bill.
Motion 4:
This motion is related to Motion 6 to amend clause 15(3) and removes the authority of the board to approve or reject Pension Committee recommendations for contribution rate increases for employers.
This motion, in conjunction with Motion 6 to amend clause 15(3), means that the power to recommend and implement increases will lie with the pension committee, not the NEBS Board.
Motion 5:
As originally drafted, Bill 12 proposed that the Pension Committee be composed of two independent members and such other members as the board determines.
The standing committee heard the concerns that the composition of the Pension Committee was seen to be weighted to favour the interests of employer members over beneficiaries, and that employees were left without an effective voice in the governance of the NEBS plan.
The standing committee passed a motion to amend clause 12 to provide for equal employee/employer balance, with one independent member of the Pension Committee. It also provides that the pension committee shall elect its own chair. The standing committee believes that this amendment to the bill will implement a fair and balanced governance model for the NEBS plan.
Mr. Speaker, I now ask to turn the report over to my colleague Mr. Yakeleya.
Thank you, Mr. Moses.
Motion 6:
As originally drafted, clause 15 of Bill 12 authorizes the Pension Committee, at any time, to retroactively reduce accrued ancillary benefits and to reduce core pension benefits on a going-forward basis.
In the event that there are insufficient assets to maintain the solvency of the NEBS plan, Bill 12 also requires that the Pension Committee request the consent of the NEBS Board to increase contributions to the pension fund before taking any actions to change or reduce benefits.
This section of the bill, as originally written, also gives the board the power to veto any proposed increase to the rate of contributions by employer members.
The standing committee listened carefully to the concerns raised by many of the presenters who viewed these authorities as placing an undue burden on employee beneficiaries to pay for the costs of an underfunded pension. This was seen to be especially problematic given the lack of employee representation on the pension committee.
As a result, the standing committee proposed amendments replacing clause 15 with a new clause that removes the ability of the pension committee to retroactively reduce any earned benefit as a way of dealing with insufficient assets in the plan.
There is one exception to this general prohibition against the retroactive reduction of accrued benefits:
This exception occurs only in the specific case of the accrual of cost of living indexing benefits accrued after December 31, 2004, where an employer withdraws from the plan or the plan is terminated.
If there are insufficient assets, and the employer has withdrawn or the plan has been terminated, then indexing benefits earned after December 31, 2004, are not guaranteed but are, instead, discretionary.
This exception is in keeping with the current plan text, in which plan members only accrue a right to receive indexing benefits if the plan is not wound up or an employer has not withdrawn.
In addition to the prohibition against the retroactive reduction of accrued benefits, the amended provision gives the Pension Committee the authority to increase contribution rates as one of the ways of addressing an insufficiency of assets in the plan.
As well, this motion removes the clause giving the board a veto power over contribution increases. As a result, the authority for managing pension fund solvency will rest with the Pension Committee.
This motion also has the effect of ensuring that the NEBS Pension Plan remains a defined-benefit plan. For greater certainty, this is enshrined through the proposal in Motion 1 to include the term “defined-benefit” in clause 2 of the bill which outlines the purpose of the act.
Motion 7:
The purpose of this motion is to bring the language of this provision in Bill 12 in line with the language used in Nunavut’s Bill 1, so that the bills mirror each other as closely as possible.
This has the effect of making the wording of this clause more precise. It removes the ability of the Minister to direct either an Aboriginal government or the legislative or judicial branches of the territorial government to apply for membership in the NEBS plan.
Motion 8:
This is a technical amendment designed to go with the amendment to clause 15, Motion 6. This motion eliminates the option of proposing, in an actuarial report, a retroactive reduction of benefits in the event of a funding shortfall.
Motion 9:
This motion would require the Minister to table in the Legislative Assembly an actuarial valuation report within 120 days of receipt, or, if the Assembly is not sitting, at the first available opportunity when it next sits.
Motion 10:
This motion requires the Minister to table in the Assembly the Pension Committee’s financial report within 120 days of receipt, or, if the Assembly is not sitting, at the first available opportunity when it next sits.
As with Motion 9, the purpose of this motion is simply to ensure, through legislation, that this information is made available to the public. Motions 9 and 10 were favoured by the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut’s Standing Committee on Legislation and were added to Bill 12, with the concurrence of this standing committee and the GNWT’s Minister of Finance to ensure symmetry with Nunavut’s Bill 1.
Motion 11:
Under the heading “Disclosure to Members,” Bill 12 contains a clause requiring that 60 days’ advance notice be provided to any pension beneficiary adversely affected by any decision of the Pension Committee to retroactively reduce accrued ancillary benefits.
With the amendment to clause 15, Motion 6, removing the authority to retroactively reduce accrued ancillary pension benefits, such a period of advance notice is no longer necessary.
Nonetheless, the standing committee feels that any reductions to ancillary and/or core benefits planned by the Pension Committee on a going-forward basis warrant 60 days’ advance notice to affected plan members. This amendment ensures that such notice is provided.
Motion 12:
As with Motion 7, the intent of this motion is to mirror the equivalent provision of the Nunavut legislation.
This amendment has the effect of ensuring, where the plan is being wound up, that whatever notice is possible is being given.
Mr. Speaker, now I turn the report over to the chair, Mr. Nadli.
Thank you, Mr. Yakeleya. Mr. Nadli.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. The Standing Committee on Government Operations’ review of Bill 12 is the result of a highly collaborative process. The standing committee wishes to thank everyone involved in the review of this bill for their assistance and input.
During the clause-by-clause review, the standing committee and Minister agreed to the 12 amendments to Bill 12 outlined in the motions above.
Following the clause-by-clause review, a motion was carried to report Bill 12, Northern Employee Benefits Services Pension Plan Act, as amended and reprinted, as ready for consideration in Committee of the Whole.
This concludes the standing committee’s review.
Thank you, Mr. Nadli. Mr. Nadli.
